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The Order of Things and People: 
Vertical Non-State Surveillance 
_Abstract
Socially produced security concerns underlie the proliferation of urban surveillance 
practices through informal policing. Neighborhood watch and neighborhood patrol 
initiatives have recently mushroomed in several countries in Europe, spurred by a cul-
ture of insecurity that has continuously and globally grown since the seventies. Such 
practices signal the intensification of struggles for social control and order in the urban 
space, but also the capillarization of surveillance, devolved from waning state institu-
tions onto the citizenry. Neighborhood patrols police the urban landscape, blame sus-
pect Others for spoiling it, and enforce a particular aesthetic order which, in turn, le-
gitimizes social hierarchies along nation, race, gender, and class lines. Through an 
empirically informed analysis of the security practices enacted by a neighborhood pa-
trol in the peripheries of Rome, I trace the genealogies and cultural tenets of what I 
call vertical non-state surveillance as a form of informal policing of subaltern Others 
in the urban space. I explore the ways in which this form of surveillance meets ne-
oliberal conceptions of citizenship, becoming productive of new subjectivities and 
socialities, and argue that such forms of surveillance need to be linked with the polit-
ical economies and the materialities of the urban spaces in which they emerge. 
1_Introduction 
The rise of the security paradigm marks one of the most crucial shifts in Western cul-
tures, if not globally, of the past decades. 1,2 In the course of this development, whose 
origins can be traced back to the economic crisis of the 1970s,3 security has emerged 
as a key frame of intelligibility and organization of contemporary life, and has progres-
sively become “a powerful diacritic of social relations, a key point of encounter be-
tween citizens, non-citizens, and states, and a framework within which many forms of 
political, economic, and cultural life are enacted.” 4 This global shift that has placed 
various forms of insecurities at the heart of numberless discourses and practices has 
produced what has been termed a ‘culture of fear,’ 5 ‘cultures of insecurity,’ 6 or a ‘cul-
ture of security.’ 7 ‘Security,’ as a discursive notion, has become productive of new im-
aginaries and materialities, inflecting political ideologies and structuring social rela-
tions to a greater extent than before. Increasing concerns with security have extended 
the governance of insecurity from the state to various assemblages permeating social 
life in its multiple spaces, from schools to stadiums, from libraries to shops.8 This ob-
sessive attention to security and the sense that surveillance is becoming a central ele-
ment of a whole way of life undergird the emergence of what David Lyon calls ‘sur-
veillance culture’: 
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[Surveillance] is no longer merely something external that impinges on our lives. 
It is something that everyday citizens comply with — willingly and wittingly, or 
not — negotiate, resist, engage with, and, in novel ways, even initiate and desire. 
From being an institutional aspect of modernity or a technologically enhanced 
mode of social discipline or control, it is now internalized and forms part of eve-
ryday reflections on how things are and of the repertoire of everyday practices.9 
This article is concerned with one such everyday practice in its recently (re)emergent 
form: neighborhood patrol initiatives in the urban space, which entail the mobilization 
of private citizens to protect neighborhoods against property-related crime. Such forms 
of informal policing are contemporaneously mushrooming in several countries in Eu-
rope: among others, the German Bürgerwehren, the Dutch burgerwachten, and the Ital-
ian ronde signal the intensification of struggles for social control and order in the urban 
space. They often intertwine with other technology-mediated surveillance practices, 
such as neighborhood watch groups using WhatsApp, Facebook, or other technologies 
purposely designed for urban surveillance. In so doing, they exhibit certain continuities 
with past forms of social control 10 at the same time that they introduce new forms of 
surveillance through the use of new technologies. The phenomenon of neighborhood 
patrolling is not new, and it has different histories in different settings. The United 
Kingdom and the United States have a longer history of forms of informal policing than 
continental Europe does, for example.11 Also, prior to the establishment of the police 
as state institution, the task of maintaining public order was carried out by self-orga-
nized citizen militias, which have only abandoned this role in the wake of the consoli-
dation of the state as unique provider for its citizens’ security.12 Yet, the reappearance 
of such forms of informal policing in times of the security paradigm deserves attention 
in ethnographic detail, for it can reveal a great deal about contemporary metamorpho-
ses: the social and cultural shifts under the grip of insecuritization,13 contemporary 
transformations of the urban space and of the socialities it buttresses, and, overarch-
ingly, the reconfigurations of the state in securitarian neoliberalism — the form of ac-
tually existing neoliberalism aimed at managing increasingly precarious surplus popu-
lations by resorting to security discourses, practices, and policies.14 Importantly, the 
reappearance of informal policing can also tell us how such practices and the discourses 
accompanying them contribute to normalizing surveillance culture, and in so doing, 
disguise the profound inequalities and exclusionary logics that underlie rationalities of 
surveillance.15 This article is conversant with surveillance literature that links the urban 
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space and a political economy reading with capillary forms of surveillance as manifes-
tations of a synoptic power that reproduces urban power relations through the circula-
tion of particular imaginaries — here, imaginaries of insecurity, on the one hand, and 
of abjection, crime, and deviance of subaltern Roma, on the other.16 Beyond a concern 
with synoptic viewing, discourses, and representations, the article’s argument extends 
into exploring practices of surveillance increasingly enacted by citizens in Western Eu-
rope. 
Building on an ethnography carried out between 2014 and 2017, this article investi-
gates the surveillance practices of a neighborhood patrol group in the peripheries of 
Rome as an embodiment of contemporary surveillance culture. It explores the historical 
roots of this practice, the cultural tenets and the imaginaries that undergird it, as well 
as the ways in which it (re)produces subjectivities and socialities. Finally, it connects 
such forms of surveillance with the particular materialities and political economies of 
the urban spaces in which they emerge.17 
2_Informal Policing: Cultural Roots, Historical Lineages 
In Italy, forms of citizen mobilization for purposes of policing are rooted in the coun-
try’s fascist past. The first such manifestations in the past century were groups mobi-
lized voluntarily under what came to be known as squadrismo, a far-right inspired par-
amilitary movement composed of former combatants from World War I. They 
organized voluntary patrols which sought to hunt down and violently repress ideologi-
cal adversaries and trade union leaders under the pretense of pushing back the Bolshe-
vik menace and redressing the geopolitical wrongs that Italy had suffered, which were 
encapsulated in the imaginary of the patria offesa (offended fatherland).18 In 1919, the 
squads were absorbed into Mussolini’s Fasci Italiani di combattimento, regarded as the 
first fascist form of political organization, and were instrumental in Mussolini’s ascent 
to power in 1922. After the demise of the fascist regime in the wake of World War II, 
such forms of vigilantism receded, but violent acts surged periodically throughout the 
1960s as youth from the Movimento Sociale Italiano perpetrated acts of political ter-
rorism. As political animosities dwindled, this kind of violence waned progressively 
throughout the seventies.19 
However, voluntary patrols have survived the demise of fascism as a political regime 
and went through a considerable metamorphosis, particularly in the Northern Po Valley, 
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or Pianura Padana area, where regional ethnonationalism surged with strength in the 
1970s.20 In those regions where the Lega Padana — which subsequently became the 
Lega Nord — was popular, citizens organized what is known as ronde padane, patrol-
ling neighborhoods and small cities or villages to maintain order and prevent crime. 
Such initiatives, mobilizing some of the fascist paraphernalia of paramilitarism but less 
intent on using violence, flourished in particular during the mid-1990s, amidst fierce 
societal and political debates on the perceived necessity to control migration fluxes. In 
less than twenty years, from the 1970s to the 1990s, Italy turned from an emigration 
country — one of the most important in southern Europe — to an immigration coun-
try.21 Growing numbers of African and Asian immigrants in the streets of Italian cities 
generated a wave of social alarm framed as a protracted ‘social emergency,’ 22 which 
sometimes materialized in violent attacks against non-white immigrants. The ronde pa-
dane kept immigrants under surveillance and sought to oust them from spaces that the 
patrols controlled. Sex workers and transsexuals were also on the list of suspects sub-
jected to surveillance,23 revealing that the concerns of the ronde were not primarily 
grounded in widely felt insecurities and a benign citizen animus of collective self-pro-
tection, but in a wider conservative ideological complex. While, for a long time, such 
initiatives remained informal, local, relatively sporadic, and confined to the north of 
the country, the security provisions of 2009 inscribed citizen patrols into the law, albeit 
under particular conditions.24 The legal inscription of ronde largely prescribed surveil-
lance as something that ‘voluntary observers’ (osservatori voluntari 25) among the pop-
ulation could and should undertake in support of the municipalities’ efforts to ensure 
security, as a form of what was later coined ‘participatory security.’ Such rendition by 
the media, political actors, and security professionals alike echoed the positive conno-
tations of notions of ‘participatory democracy.’ As such, it effectively sought to purge 
a phenomenon historically tainted by the ghost of fascism, and to transpose it into a 
democratic ethos of active citizenship. Yet the law also imposed limitations on such 
initiatives. Those who wished to undertake this form of ‘participatory security’ had to 
register with the local municipalities to inform the authorities of their intent and had to 
wear special vests that marked them as ‘voluntary observers.’ Additionally, they were 
barred from patrolling with vehicles or using animals in their endeavor. In the event 
that they might witness crime, they were expected to alert the forces of order, but were 
disallowed from intervening directly. 
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Throughout 2010 and in the following years, many Italian newspaper articles called 
the decree regulating citizen surveillance a ‘flop’: very few groups had indeed mobi-
lized in such forms of informal policing. However, in 2016, and with major impetus in 
2017, Italy has been the stage of a fast and furious multiplication of neighborhood pa-
trols, as ‘exasperated citizens’ and ‘gente per bene’ (decent people) increasingly mobi-
lize for the ‘defense’ of their neighborhoods. The legitimizing narratives for these pa-
trols revolve around two main themes: pervasive urban insecurity caused by a 
perceived unprecedented rise in crime, and the incapacity or unwillingness of the state 
to protect its own citizens. In the following section, I will describe the practices of one 
such neighborhood patrol, embedding them in the discourses which they propagate: 
through social but also traditional media, from the peripheries of Rome.26 
3_‘Ronde pontenonine’ 
“People are afraid,” stated the local newspaper of Ponte di Nona in March 2013: 
… afraid to return home late at night and in danger of being assaulted by criminals, 
hiding in wait for their victim, people are afraid to return home and to find their 
own house violated and robbed, people are afraid to have persons walking behind 
them on the streets, people are increasingly afraid, at a certain time at night starts 
the curfew, there are ever more people who do not get out at night, even for a 
simple walk.27 
The ‘forces of order’ are overwhelmed, the author adds, and are thus unable to control 
neighborhood territories using the limited means at their disposal. This has led him to 
take the initiative, he explains, to set up a group of devoted citizens to reconnoiter the 
territory by organizing night patrols: 
Thus, in the night of 7 March 2013, I have initiated, together with other citizens, 
my first ronda for the security of the area. We are a group of people aware that we 
need to do something concrete … aware that it is unbearable to see our District28 
being continuously violated. It has been great for me to initiate together with other 
people this adventure which will surely cultivate in us the maturity of doing some-
thing useful for all, and which certainly gratified us by making us feel more like 
citizens, while also being a response towards ourselves, who strongly believe in 
healthy and constructive life values.29 
This is the description of the beginning of a neighborhood patrolling initiative brought 
to fruition in 2013 by a middle-class man in his early sixties in the periphery of Rome. 
Despite initial opposition from the neighborhood committee, the group kept patrolling 
the neighborhood, intensified its media appearances, set up a social media profile on 
Facebook, and started recruiting volunteers throughout the neighborhoods around 
Ponte di Nona. By the end of 2014, the group counted about eight members and used 
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three cars; by the middle of 2015, the number of cars and patrol members had multi-
plied threefold, with inhabitants of the neighboring Corcolle and Colle degli Abeti set-
ting up their own patrols and working closely with the leader of the Ponte di Nona 
group. 
The patrol, which was institutionalized as a non-governmental association, is called 
an ‘operative actions coordination unit,’ a name with militaristic overtones that em-
ploys equally militaristic symbols in its branding. The patrol’s logo, a target on a green 
background, is displayed on their website and on their Facebook page, as well as on 
their private patrol cars. The group polices the borders of the neighborhood by regularly 
making stops (they call such a stop presidio, translatable to ‘garrison’ or ‘defense’) in 
strategic places at various entrance points, looking out for intruders. Sometimes, they 
follow at low speed and photograph men walking alone or in pairs on the streets Par-
ticularly in this post-pedestrian neighborhood where human presence on the sidewalks 
is rather scarce, the practice of walking appears as out of place and hence suspicious. 
Yet, it is never white people, but brown and black men who are racially profiled as not 
belonging to the neighborhood. If someone’s presence raises enough suspicion, as in 
the case of those presumed to be Roma, the patrol orders them to leave the neighbor-
hood, makes sure they do so, and then boasts about such events on social media.30 
After harsh criticism of the initiative, which was deemed dangerously close to his-
torical fascist patrols, the group denied any parallel between their practices and the 
tradition of the ronde. They claimed vociferously that this is not what they do, refram-
ing their initiative instead as ‘voluntary surveillance’ (vigilanza voluntaria). However, 
the article through which the leader announced the initiative in the local newspaper 
referred to the group as ronde pontenonine, echoing, without the shadow of a doubt, 
the earlier ronde padane. But with the reference to ‘voluntary surveillance,’ the group 
sought to legitimize a still-criticized practice by inscribing it as an act undertaken under 
the provisions of the 2009 security law. Their claims to protect and defend ‘legality’ 
notwithstanding, the group, in fact, does not meet the legal requirements stipulated by 
the 2009 decree: they patrol with vehicles, are not registered in a special register of the 
municipality, and do not wear vests designating them as such. Thereby, they flagrantly 
break the law, under the averted eyes of the local police and Carabinieri, with whom 
they network and whom they grandiloquently praise on their Facebook page.31 
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The group justifies their initiative by framing the neighborhood as crime-ridden, 
which they allege is due to the proximity of the camp of Salone, one of the largest 
campi nomadi in Italy, which hosts a Roma population who have been migrating from 
Eastern Europe since the 1960s. Despite the group’s claims, this neighborhood is not 
particularly prominent in crime statistics. On the contrary, data shows that Rome is a 
safer city compared to others in Italy, and that in particular its peripheries are less prone 
to crime. A staggering majority of property-related crimes registered in the metropoli-
tan area of Rome happen in the city (82%), while only 18% occur in the outer periph-
eries.32 Yet, the perception of insecurity is more prominent in the peripheries than the 
center of Italy’s capital: while only 41% of the inhabitants of the center believe that 
Rome is rather unsafe or not safe at all, the percentage of those in the peripheries who 
feel similarly rises to 55%.33 Ponte di Nona is, by all standards, a safe, middle-class 
neighborhood. In fact, the neighborhood committee recurrently criticizes the idea that 
Ponte di Nona is crime-ridden, claiming that ‘this is not the Bronx.’ 
The group publicizes its activities in online media outlets and in the far-right news-
paper Il Tempo, in which the leader publishes articles and opinion pieces related to 
security. They also regularly post photographs and videos from their nocturnal patrols, 
and various political commentaries addressing topics such as Islam, immigration, 
campi nomadi, as well as local, national, and EU politics on a network of Facebook 
pages. Openly racist views and incitement to violence are common on their own Face-
book page — and often follow a punitive rhetoric stating that criminals must be taught 
a lesson, and that Italians must take matters into their own hands in order to defend 
themselves. One such typical comment, posted on the group’s page in August 2017 
about a man arrested for abduction and attempted blackmail, stated: “Death for him 
would be too little, these kinds of ordure (letame) should be handed over to the people 
for a just lynching; such should be his death, slow and atrocious.” Such discourses 
extend beyond the online realm: I have personally witnessed discussions about lynch-
ing among group members, with the leader asserting that lynching could happen at any 
time given the ‘exasperation of people around here.’ 34 On September 29, 2018, the 
leader warned on Facebook that in the following days, they would prepare an action 
‘for the good of our entire territory’ with regards to the camp of Salone, advising resi-
dents to avoid certain areas where there would be ‘public order issues.’ In another note, 
he added that camp inhabitants ‘have no idea what is awaiting them.’ 
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The initiator of the patrol openly states his regret that Italy lacks a leader like Mus-
solini, who would certainly have known how to restore order and dignity to the country. 
The ‘forces of order’ — the police, the Carabinieri, and especially the military — are 
often publicly praised; the leader also intimated to me privately that he thinks a military 
coup is the only viable option to restore order and ‘healthy moral values’ in the country. 
Like other actors in Rome — such as members of various neighborhood committees — 
they call for military intervention in campi nomadi, which they epitomize as territories 
of lawlessness, and they advocate, in more or less clear terms, for various ‘final solu-
tions’ with regards to populations they see as problematic, like the so-called nomadi, 
or Muslims. 
To advocate for closures of the campi nomadi, they organize yearly protests, whether 
downtown or in their neighborhood, which invariably involve members of CasaPound 
— the main openly neo-fascist political party in Italy — leading the protests by mega-
phone with nationalistic, anti-immigrant slogans. In 2015, during their yearly protest, 
they mobilized the far-right Alleanza Nazionale-Fratelli d’Italia party to gather signa-
tures for a petition against the campi nomadi. The leader has personal ties to Gianni 
Alemanno, a former member of the far-right Movimento Sociale Italiano who became 
mayor of Rome in 2008, and who in 2014 visited the neighborhood and met with the 
group leader; photographs of the two side by side appeared in the media. He praises the 
recent appointment of ‘our friend’ Matteo Salvini as minister of internal affairs, pres-
aging a return to order and the dismantlement of the campi nomadi, a cause on which 
the leader of the Lega Nord has long been capitalizing upon to garner votes. Notwith-
standing these clear political links with the far right, which, again, makes their surveil-
lance activities illegal, the group still claims that they are apolitical. This is, partly, what 
allows them to cooperate with other neighborhood committees according to the princi-
ple of segmentary politics,35 amounting to alliances that contextually form around par-
ticular issues such as campi nomadi, but whose actors remain antithetical on other top-
ics and may have opposing political views altogether. 
4_Things and People Out of Place 
On the first patrol that I witnessed in November 2014, the leader took me on a ‘tour’ of 
the neighborhood in order to explain the reasons for their mobilization. He showed me 
heaps of waste on the sidewalks and run-down streets with potholes and grass growing 
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uncontrollably in the urban space, which he took to be signs of blight and of the aban-
donment of Roman peripheries by the authorities, but also, importantly, as clear mani-
festations of urban insecurity.36 It was not only ‘matter out of place’ 37 that was the 
concern of the group, but also people out of place, whom the leader then went on to 
show me, driving me to an area outside the neighborhood where sex workers, including 
transsexuals, were waiting for their clients on the roadways. Immigrants and nomadi, 
as Roma are erroneously referred to in Italy, were also seen as out of place. The spec-
tacle of disorder that the leader of the group showed me on this first patrol betrays 
notions of order related to a particular urban aesthetic of cleanliness and orderliness 
embedded in the materiality of the neighborhood. Broken or out-of-place objects are a 
sign of blight — degrado — which metonymically stands for urban insecurity. Through 
their insistence on degrado, the discourses of the patrol naturalize the articulation of 
urban insecurity with blight, a widespread and pervasive concern in Rome that mobi-
lizes people both left and right of the political spectrum. Material blight is also linked 
to the notion of the moral decay of the country, the loss of values and of discipline 
signified by the ubiquity of matter, people, and morals out of place. The culprits for 
this decay, the group claims, are corrupt politicians, leftist ‘buonisti,’ the undeserving 
poor, and the culturally barbaric and uncivilizable immigrants and nomadi, which they 
portray in stark contrast to what the leader of the group calls “the culture of civility 
which is ours.” 38 He deplores the decadence of Rome, once a grandiose empire out on 
a civilizing mission, while he regularly commends his group’s members, similar neigh-
borhood patrols, and far-right activists, for being brave and selfless defenders of 
healthy moral standards, civility, the nation, and ‘true’ Italianness. The genealogy of 
such conceptions — abundant in the discourse of the group — can be traced back to 
the ideology that fascist intellectuals promoted in the thirties around “valour, justice, 
law, order, dedication to collective interests, and high moral standards. In short, virtus 
romana.” 39 
The remedy that the group prescribes to counter the moral and material decadence 
of Rome is a citizen mobilization to combat degrado, crime, and illegality. But under 
this pretense, by policing the presence of Others in this predominantly middle-class 
white neighborhood, the group mobilizes for the defense of particular social aesthetics 
of urban order. They do not actively combat degrado by, for instance, removing waste 
from inappropriate places themselves; instead, they assert that degrado is the result of 
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the presence of nomadi and immigrants in the neighborhood, reproducing and circulat-
ing imaginaries that intimately link migration and racialized representations of the 
Roma with blight, crime, danger, and decadence. The images that they share on the 
social media construct immigrants, and in particular the Roma, as abject Others devoid 
of humanity. Black men and Roma women and children searching in dumpsters for 
reusable objects are not framed as people in need, but as uncivilized and barbaric infe-
rior beings producing disorder and provoking repulsion.40 Through the repeated circu-
lation of such images on social media and the selective visibilization of some of their 
economic practices as abject, the workings of synoptic viewing are made visible. They 
render certain categories of people hypervisible under particular angles, reducing their 
knowability to stereotypical and prejudicial depictions that then circulate and multi-
ply.41 Such surveillance practices have a threefold effect: first, they lead to a classifi-
cation of subjects according to their supposed ‘dangerousness’; second, they attempt to 
expel the undesirables on grounds of the threat they represent; and third, they generate 
a discourse that aestheticizes the social order thus produced. These three effects amount 
to what I have unpacked elsewhere, building on Nicholas Mirzoeff’s work, as a ‘com-
plex of securitarian visuality.’ 42 Neighborhood patrols and the discourses and imagi-
naries that they circulate are a practice of maintaining social order along nation, class, 
and race lines, driving home the point that: 
[M]ore than simply watching, surveillance practices exert influence and reproduce 
power relations through technological and non-technological means alike. 
Through the imposition of categories, processes, and differential forms of expo-
sure, surveillance becomes a project of social ordering and world-making, even if 
its efficacy at achieving its primary intended goals (e.g. crime control) is limited 
or inconsistent.43 
The surveillance practices of the neighborhood patrol provide a depoliticizing script 
for othering, grounded in notions of an ontological insecurity that preclude any desire 
and ability to understand social hierarchies as results of longstanding and unjust power 
relations. They fixate and legitimize the social order and existing hierarchies by pro-
cesses through which those at the bottom are constructed as dangerous Others to be 
expelled, and ultimately exterminated. 
5_The Productivity of Surveillance Culture 
Practices of urban ‘voluntary surveillance’ are predicated upon processes of classifica-
tion, categorization, and legitimization of exclusion that are continuously reproduced, 
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and thus reproduce social hierarchies. But this is only the first layer of the productive 
capacities of surveillance culture. Behind the ‘mythologies of surveillance’ 44 that un-
derpin and shape such practices lies a tremendous productive capacity that is yet to be 
fully uncovered. In what follows, I will sketch a few lines along which such capacities 
may be fruitfully read, and which, I believe, go some way in explaining the multiplica-
tion of surveillance practices in our contemporary world. The productive capacities of 
surveillance practices are connected to, and fertilized by, powerful narratives that play 
a role in structuring the world and ordering people’s actions. We have seen, for instance, 
how the leader of the patrol casts their endeavor as a source of subjective citizenship 
through which they acquire symbolic value. In so doing, he taps into the neoliberal 
narrative of ‘active citizenship’ and into the vocabularies of ‘participatory security’ that 
it has recently begotten. Elsewhere in Europe, like in Austria,45 the emergence of the 
category of a ‘security citizen’ as helper of the police in all matters related to maintain-
ing urban order attests to the imbrication of security and citizenship. This nexus proves 
productive of novel forms of subjectivation cementing social hierarchies in which the 
lower classes are constructed as ontologically dangerous, in opposition to those, like 
the middle class, who do not represent a threat. Still others, like the neighborhood pa-
trol, become singularly able to impart security, thus claiming a position at the top of 
social hierarchies. In a world perceived and constructed as unsafe, the fact that the pa-
trol purports to grant security to others produces symbolic capital. When people thank 
the patrol on the streets, for instance, the value thus produced is reinvested in a strength-
ened motivation to carry on ‘voluntary surveillance’ under the pretense of a sacrificial 
and selfless service to the ‘community.’ 
These surveillance practices are also complicit in producing abject Others: in the 
process of abjection, the subject comes to constitute itself through the border it casts 
between the self and the abject Other and through the very expulsion that abjection 
entails.46 The numerous references, on the Facebook page of the patrol, to people as 
‘manure,’ ‘ordure,’ ‘dung,’ and ‘muck’ (letame) and the repetition of images of toilet 
paper and caricaturized vomiting that accompany political statements not to the 
leader’s liking, attest to the production of the abject Other, and, simultaneously, to the 
constitution of the surveillant subject as profoundly repulsed. Repeating the trope of 
‘exasperated people’ expands the range of action that may be envisaged well past the 
point of legitimability and normalizes the imaginaries of vigilantism with which the 
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Facebook page is replete. Inciting people to ‘take matters into their own hands’ when 
it comes to the expulsion of abject Others adds, then, a layer of violence to the consti-
tution of the surveillant subject, revealing the productivity of surveillance practices in 
engendering violence, be it symbolic or physical. 
Discourses that praise vigilante practices (re)produce the idea of the state being in-
capable of ensuring its citizens’ security. Such discourses reveal the complex and am-
biguous metamorphoses of the state in securitarian neoliberalism. On the one hand, if 
a certain trope claims the retrenchment of the state in neoliberal times, practices of 
informal policing instead reveal how deeply the capillarization of the state’s control 
function can run, giving way to what Gilles Deleuze called ‘societies of control.’47 
These replace Michel Foucault’s societies of discipline and their traditional institutions 
by generalizing a form of ‘free-floating control.’ 48 On the other hand, practices of in-
formal policing make apparent the phenomenal extent to which the ‘right hand of the 
state,’ tasked with repression, has outgrown the left hand, responsible for social poli-
cies, equality, and support of the most destitute. I have already hinted at this shift, ren-
dered visible through the ubiquitous critique to buonismo and assistenzialismo re-
counted earlier. Such critiques reflect the emergence of the ‘neoliberal Centaur state’ 
punishing those at the bottom of social hierarchies while bestowing privileges at the 
top. This, in turn, has accompanied the shift from a model of inclusive community 
illustrated by the concern for social policies, to that of the exclusive state predicated 
upon control of criminality and the punishment of the most destitute groups.49 Though 
contradicted by all data, the trope that criminality is vertiginously on the rise obfuscates 
the disproportionate use of repression and mobilizes increasing numbers of people con-
cerned with illusory insecurities. While citizens labor to keep those insecurities under 
control, the obsession with security precludes a substantial political debate on issues of 
justice and social policies. It is incontestable that the idea of the state is changing under 
the pressure of neoliberal discourses on ‘participatory security,’ but with vigilante-like 
discourses it undergoes a further shift towards the capillarization of surveillance, con-
firming what other scholars have pointed out: that we are in the middle of a shift in 
which surveillance is being devolved from state institutions to the citizenry.50 
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6_Vertical Non-state Surveillance and Its Political Economies 
The concepts of ‘peer’ or ‘lateral surveillance’ have been used to refer to practices in 
which people monitor one another.51 However, neither ‘peer,’ nor ‘lateral surveillance’ 
are appropriate analytical terms for the practices of informal policing that I have de-
scribed here: on the one hand, the people who regularly come under the scrutiny of the 
patrol are not ‘peers,’ but socially subaltern groups, which is crucial analytically; rather 
than lateral, this is, then, a case of vertical surveillance, but one not enacted by the state, 
as the concept is usually understood, but by middle-class citizens on behalf of the state. 
On the other hand, the patrol does not target specific individuals, but looks out for 
suspicious Others in a given space, constructing them as dangerous in the very act of 
surveillance. It is not people, but the territory of the neighborhood that is the primary 
object of surveillance, and subaltern Others become surveilled subjects once they pen-
etrate the space of the neighborhood.  
Vertical non-state surveillance is inextricable from the spatial dimension in which it 
takes place, not only because its object is the space of the neighborhood, but also in 
virtue of the identities and subjectivities which are produced by the act of categorizing 
people into ‘belonging’ and ‘not belonging’ to the neighborhood. Such forms of sur-
veillance alter sociality, and simultaneously the relationship that people have with their 
inhabited space that needs to be perpetually protected from suspicious Others. Surveil-
lance enacts ‘a way of seeing, a way of being.’ 52 Sight becomes a stencil of black and 
white categorizations of the world, as people are endowed with a purported dangerous-
ness that fixates them as abjects to be watched — and ultimately expulsed — or with 
the recognition of their ontology as belonging, and hence safe, subjects. Sight super-
poses what one sees with what one already ‘knows’ about the world, and reaffirms 
uncritically the categories upon which social hierarchies are predicated, fixating the 
social in petrified structures in which the ones at the bottom of hierarchies are recast as 
ontologically dangerous, and relegated to expulsions and exterminations. Surveillance 
culture institutes, circulates, and ultimately normalizes a way of being through which 
‘vigilant visualities’ 53, or, what Daniel Goldstein calls ‘governmentalities of watchful-
ness’ 54 unfold: a mode of being watchful in the world which forecloses socialities 
across class and race boundaries. 
While purporting to defend a territory invaded by criminal Others, these forms of 
surveillance also bring into being communities to be protected, reshaping urban and 
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peri-urban neighborhoods spatially and politically.55 They (re)produce ‘economies of 
fear and hate’ 56 and restructure socialities in the community of patrol members and 
Facebook followers, who congregate, subsequently, for the defense of an imagined 
community of ‘true Italians’ and ‘decent people.’ Vertical non-state surveillance, thus, 
produces both concrete communities ‘seeking safety in an insecure world’ 57, and im-
agined ones, grounded in notions of purity, decency, and righteousness, and perceived 
as always in danger and thus in need to be defended. Surveillance culture has, thus, the 
power to reproduce and multiply itself, reliant as it is on vocabularies of intimacy, to-
getherness, and belonging. It (re)produces domopolitical rationalities in which the ter-
ritory, be it national or urban, is infused with the warm connotations of home, a home 
that needs protection from undesirable outsiders, reconfiguring this relationship in the 
Schmittian terms of ‘us’ versus ‘them.’ 58 The scissions that such rationalities produce 
between outsiders and insiders also produce fusions, because the community of ‘we’ 
— those in need of defending — is imagined, against much evidence, as homogeneous 
in terms of class, race, nationality, political vision, and moral values. The surveillance 
practices analyzed here thus operate a simplified reordering of the social along the mul-
tiple, intersecting lines of inside / outside, safe / unsafe, us / them, ‘true’ citizens / abject 
ones, and across the identity categories produced by class, race, gender, and other mark-
ers. 
Practices of vertical non-state surveillance, through the centrality of their embed-
dedness in a given space, are also deeply connected to particular urban materialities 
and their political economies, suggesting that a culturalist approach to the phenomenon 
is insufficient, as it cannot account for all its complexities. Vertical non-state surveil-
lance cannot be extricated from the wider political economy defining the space in which 
it finds fertile ground. Discourses of pervasive urban insecurity, neoliberal narratives 
of active citizenship and ‘participatory security,’ the sense that ‘the fatherland’ is in 
danger due to uncontrollable amounts of undesirable immigrants and corrupt politi-
cians, and a stark desire for order, authority, and the defense of ‘healthy’ life values are 
the mythologies underlying such practices. But these discourses are underpinned by the 
effects of the financial crisis of 2007–2008, which precipitated many of the Roman 
peripheries in a process of incipient degentrification. In this process, the propertied 
suburbanites have seen the prices of their houses decrease and urban infrastructure de-
cay. In the subtext of the vertical non-state surveillance mobilization lies the project of 
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defending the interests of homeowners in the neighborhood against the devaluation of 
their houses. The middle-class owners of suburban housing come to constitute what 
Neil Smith called ‘the revanchist city’: 
... a reaction against the supposed ‘theft’ of the city, a desperate defense of a chal-
lenged phalanx of privileges, cloaked in the populist language of civic morality, 
family values and neighborhood security. More than anything the revanchist city 
expresses a race/class/gender terror felt by middle- and ruling-class whites who 
are suddenly stuck in place by a ravaged property market, the threat and reality of 
unemployment, the decimation of social services, and the emergence of minority 
and immigrant groups, as well as women, as powerful urban actors.59 
Neighborhood patrolling practices become thus a reactionary project of the middle-
class to defend their (somewhat) waning privileges increasingly viciously against var-
ious scapegoats identified as internal enemies. Vertical non-state surveillance is ulti-
mately aimed at expelling from the space of the neighborhood those who jeopardize 
housing values and the sense of intimacy that middle-class domopolitics entails. Con-
cerns to protect one’s class belonging deploy according to the script that surveillance 
culture produces: categorizing people as either dangerous or safe, casting watchfulness 
on the former, and mobilizing those who are seen to belong to be ever more vocal about 
ousting undesirables from the neighborhood, thus preventing it from ‘turning bad.’ As 
a follower of the neighborhood patrol’s Facebook page stressed, under a photograph of 
a ‘Gypsy van’ with a foreign license plate and the comment of the patrol leader urging 
pontenonini to be vigilant about such presence, “This neighborhood is turning bad and 
we’re the only ones who must avoid its total decay!” 60 Thus, the materiality of ‘decay’ 
cannot be disentangled from those who are blamed for bringing it into the neighbor-
hood. Within the same logic, the order of things becomes inextricable from the order 
of people that the patrol upholds. It is with the unpacking of neighborhood patrols as 
surveillance practices that it becomes apparent how an analysis of surveillance culture 
must always dialectically move between the material and the non-material, giving an-
alytical attention to the political economies and urban materialities underlining prac-
tices of vertical non-state surveillance. 
7_Conclusion 
The mushrooming of informal policing in the form of neighborhood patrols is illustra-
tive of the securitarian turn that has gathered momentum since the 1990s. The article 
has explored one such manifestation as vertical non-state surveillance, tracing its his-
torical roots back to the fascist ideology of citizen mobilization, with which it shares 
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remarkably — and worryingly — many features. Practices of vertical non-state surveil-
lance unravel according to particular visions and aesthetics of social and political order. 
Such practices are statements articulating authoritative worldviews, circulating catego-
rizations and legitimating social hierarchies along national, racial, gender, and class 
lines. 
The ethnographic material discussed has allowed for a conceptualization of vertical 
non-state surveillance as a form of informal policing directed towards subaltern Others 
in a given urban space. The article has analyzed the ways in which this kind of surveil-
lance is productive of novel forms of subjectivation predicated upon neoliberal narra-
tives of participatory security and active citizenship. Vertical non-state surveillance 
(re)produces ‘dangerous’ Others as abject. In so doing, it also constitutes the subject 
itself as violent and repulsed by the abjection it produces, but with the illusory credence 
of its own moral superiority behind which hide the desire to lynch, to ‘teach a lesson,’ 
to exterminate. Such practices simplify, stereotype, and petrify the social along antag-
onistic lines, productive of domopolitical rationalities in which the neighborhood is 
casted as a home to be protected from outsiders. Simultaneously, they produce com-
munities that, by offering the veneer of togetherness and the semblance of a just cause, 
reconfigure socialities in the security register. In the process, while tropes of ‘just 
lynchings’ and ‘exasperated citizens’ multiply, the socialities normalized by the patrol 
are increasingly grounded in violence against subaltern Others. 
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